Preemption Works

Military historians and leaders have known it for millennia. The Ethiopian campaign proved it once more:

There may be several lessons for Israel, and for the United States, in this near total rout of Islamist radicals. First: decisive unilateral pre-emption works. Confronted by an extremist enemy with a long history of terrorist acts against it, who had set up a haven for foreign militants—among fighters captured during the offensive were Arabs, Eritreans, Pakistanis, Sudanese, Yemenis, and holders of British, Canadian and Scandinavian passports—and faced with an international community unable and/or unwilling to deal effectively with the threat, the government of Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi responded decisively with a preemptive strike, albeit one technically endorsed by Somalia's phantasmal transitional government. The security of both the Horn of Africa and the world has been enhanced by this resolute action of self-defense—which the Wall Street Journal aptly described as an "act of regional hygiene."

Second: there is no substitute for "boots on the ground." Once they decided to go on the offensive, despite enjoying clear superiority—the Islamists had no aircraft—the Ethiopians did not rely exclusively or even predominantly on airpower. Some 20,000 soldiers were deployed in combat operations with many more on reserve, despite the historical enmity between Somalis and Ethiopians. Unlike the Israeli operation in last year's war in Lebanon, or U.S. preferences in Iraq until recently, there was no talk of a politically correct "light footprint."

Third, when you fight, don't tie one hand behind your back. While there are no reliable estimates of civilian casualties during the campaign, no doubt the number was elevated. Officers with whom we have been in contact are unambiguous: while they sought to minimize collateral damage to people and infrastructure, they held that responsibility for such losses rested with terrorists who hid out among civilians. Ethiopians who deployed Mi-24 Hind helicopter gun ships—and U.S. forces that subsequently launched air strikes against two "high value" targets using AC-130 gun ships—gave no quarter to fleeing militants whose vehicles became stuck in the quagmire of Somalia's flooded Juba Valley. Charred remains of dozens of vehicles still litter the landscape. The Ethiopians did what they had to do to kill the enemy. Let it be noted that Ethiopia had the advantage that their operations took place in one of the most inhospitable places on the planet, one which Western media is not attracted to—especially during the holiday season.

Fourth, an enemy cannot be destroyed unless its avenues of escape are sealed. Between advancing Ethiopian troops sweeping everything in their path, Kenyans who had closed their borders with Somalia (notwithstanding protests by the International Committee of the Red Cross), and Americans blockading the coast with the guided missile cruisers U.S.S. Bunker Hill and U.S.S. Anzio, the dock landing ship U.S.S. Ashland, and the carrier U.S.S. Eisenhower and its battle group, ICU militants had no "humanitarian corridors" through which their foreign sponsors in the Middle East could rush men and materiel.

Fifth, strike while the iron is hot. Ethiopia prudently used the time that its partner, the U.S., bought for it. Although a United Nations Security Council Resolution (1725) creating a "peacekeeping" force for Somalia was unanimously passed in early December, the resolution was so clumsily crafted—perhaps purposely—that the promised contingent has yet to be constituted, much less deployed. In the meantime, Ethiopian forces achieved all their strategic objectives. United Nations apathy did not stop Addis Ababa.

There is no greater deterrent than decisive ruthlessness.