The Real al Zarqawi
Michael Ledeen has the 411, as usual:
Terrorist groups don't fare too well when their leaders keep getting killed. This is what tamped down violence in the West Bank for the Israelis, far more so than all the lisping platitudes from the wine-and-brie set who frolic in Foggy Bottom.
Kill their leaders. When new ones emerge, kill them. The movement dissolves.
We are not fighting supermen. We are fighting barbarians who use Hotmail. Killing their leaders has an impact.
Zarqawi was a very important man in the terror network. I first noticed him some years ago, reading the German and Italian press. Several terrorist cells in those countries had been rounded up, and court documents showed that in both countries the network had been created from Tehran, by Zarqawi. Thus, years before we went into Iraq, Zarqawi was already a major player in international terrorism, and in recognition of his skills he was sent into Iraq as one of the organizers of the terror war against us and the Iraqi people.
Despite his intonations against the Shiites, and his manifest efforts to promote civil war in Iraq, Zarqawi was happy to work with the radical Shiite regime in Tehran, and they were happy to work with him. It is quite wrong to view him as a leader of one faction in a religious war; his promotion of religious conflict was simply a tactic designed to destabilize Iraq and drive out the Coalition. He and his Iranian backers/masters were desperate to promote all manner of internal Iraqi conflict: Kurds against Arabs, Turkamen against Kurds, anything that worked. It’s The Godfather all over again: the terror masters put aside their differences, sat down around the table, and made a war plan in which Sunni and Shia, Syrian and Saudi, Iranian and Iraqi cooperated against their common satanic enemy, the United States.
One other very important factoid emerged from the accounts of the attack on Zarqawi: we killed two women in the same house. We did it deliberately, because they were his key intelligence officers. From which two lessons should be drawn. First, women get something approaching parity in the jihadist terror organizations, despite endless citations from the holy Koran demanding their subservience. These were not suicide bombers, of which we have seen several exemplars in the past; these were important components of the terror headquarters. And second, when our soldiers enter terrorists’ quarters and kill women in the ensuing firefight, remind yourself that it might have been entirely proper, since the women may have been terrorists themselves.
Terrorist groups don't fare too well when their leaders keep getting killed. This is what tamped down violence in the West Bank for the Israelis, far more so than all the lisping platitudes from the wine-and-brie set who frolic in Foggy Bottom.
Kill their leaders. When new ones emerge, kill them. The movement dissolves.
We are not fighting supermen. We are fighting barbarians who use Hotmail. Killing their leaders has an impact.
1 Comments:
Thanks for highlighting Ledeen's article, Teflon. In fact, Zarqawi's elimination is even more significant than Ledeen recognized.
Zarqawi and Rahman managed an effective insurgency and hid better and longer even than Saddam himself. Bin Laden currently manages nothing effective and hides as well as if he were dead (or, is he?).
With Zarqawi's expertise missing (his most senior leaders had all been captured or killed) there will be relatively inferior training opportunities for enemies of the Iraqi police. Al-Masri cannot become an al Zarqawi overnight; he will be fortunate to avoid capture this year.
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